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Introduction
As the introduction of this Special Issue outlines (Di 
Stasio and Solga, 2017), studying education as an 
integral part of welfare state regimes had long been a 
neglected field of research, even though scholarly 
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interest has grown significantly in recent years 
(Busemeyer, 2015; Iversen and Stephens, 2008; 
Solga, 2014). Much of the existing work in compara-
tive welfare state research is concerned with the 
macro-level of policy-making and the connection 
between education and welfare state regimes 
(Iversen and Stephens, 2008; West and Nikolai, 
2013). Vice versa, scholarship in the tradition of 
educational sociology mostly analyses the micro-
level and institutional determinants of educational 
choices with a particular focus on class biases in 
access to education and associated inequalities (see, 
for example, Breen et al., 2009; Brzinsky-Fay and 
Solga, 2016; Van de Werfhorst and Mijs, 2010). This 
article, in contrast, analyses individual policy prefer-
ences and attitudes towards education policy – in 
short, public opinion. This is an important and yet 
under-researched issue because education and 
human capital formation are at the centre of the 
increasingly popular model of the ‘social investment 
state’ (Bonoli, 2013; Hemerijck, 2013), and yet it is 
largely unknown how robust and extensive political 
support for this new model of the welfare state really 
is (see also McDonnell, 2009: 425).
Our article addresses this significant research gap 
in different ways. First, our analysis makes an impor-
tant empirical contribution. The small but growing lit-
erature on public opinion about education policy 
(Ansell, 2010; Busemeyer, 2012, 2015; Busemeyer 
et al., 2011; Busemeyer and Jensen, 2012; Garritzmann, 
2015, 2016) relies on readily available comparative 
surveys of public opinion, such as the International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the European Social 
Survey (ESS) and the Eurobarometer. These surveys, 
however, only include very few and general questions 
about education policy. Instead, we use new data from 
a representative survey of public opinion on education 
and welfare state policies in eight Western European 
countries (Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden, 
Ireland, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy), which 
deals with some of the deficiencies in existing surveys. 
For one, we present a more fine-grained analysis of 
public attitudes towards the distribution of fiscal 
resources across different sectors of the education sys-
tem (early childhood education, general schooling, 
vocational education and academic higher education), 
which is not available in existing comparative surveys. 
The second empirical contribution is that we compare 
support for education policies in constrained and 
unconstrained settings in order to obtain a better esti-
mate on the robustness of support for education spend-
ing. More specifically, we study respondents’ spending 
priorities by forcing them to choose between different 
policy fields (education vs other social policies) as 
well as between educational sectors. From a more the-
oretical perspective, our article shows that socio-eco-
nomic variables, in particular individual educational 
experiences, are systematically related to policy pref-
erences. Furthermore, we find that the association 
between indicators of material self-interest and prefer-
ences becomes stronger in constrained settings com-
pared to unconstrained ones.
Before proceeding, it is important to emphasize 
that this article focuses on determinants of policy 
preferences for public spending. This is in line with 
the focus of much of the existing literature discussed 
in the next section. Of course, spending is not the 
only (and maybe not even the most important) policy 
issue when it comes to education policy, but compar-
ing preferences for (changes in) public spending pro-
vides a common ground for comparative analyses. 
This is harder to do in the case of those policy pro-
posals which depend on specific national and tempo-
ral contexts. Nevertheless, our survey also includes 
questions about policy preferences other than spend-
ing, which are, however, analysed elsewhere.
Literature review and theory
The study of public attitudes and policy preferences 
on welfare state policies has become a major field of 
research in recent years (see Svallfors, 2012 for a 
recent overview). The existing literature can be 
roughly divided into three different camps: one strand 
of literature emphasizes material self-interest as a cru-
cial determinant of policy preferences and individual-
level attitudes towards the welfare state. From this 
perspective, individual variables, such as income, 
educational background, gender, labour market status 
and social risk, shape individuals’ attitudes on differ-
ent welfare state policies (e.g. Busemeyer et al., 2009; 
Cusack et al., 2006; Hacker et al., 2013; Rehm, 2009; 
Rehm et al., 2012; Schwander et al., 2015). People are 
expected to support those policies from which they 
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derive concrete benefits themselves. A second, con-
trasting perspective is provided in scholarship that 
emphasizes the role of norms and values as determi-
nants of preferences and attitudes. This literature has 
shown that in addition to material self-interest, nor-
mative and partisan ideologies, altruistic concerns, 
religiosity and intergenerational solidarity also influ-
ence welfare state attitudes (e.g. Goerres and Tepe, 
2010; Margalit, 2013; Scheve and Stasavage, 2006).
Third, there is a growing literature that studies the 
way that institutional contexts shape individual pref-
erences (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Jaeger, 
2009; Svallfors, 1997, 2012; see also Pierson, 1993 
who introduced the notion of policy feedback). In 
many ways, this literature builds on the work on 
individual-level variables because the causal mecha-
nisms by which institutions influence attitudes on 
the micro-level are related to material self-interest as 
well as norms and values. At first, this literature was 
mostly concerned with exploring the linkages 
between encompassing welfare state regimes 
(Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Svallfors, 1997) 
and individual preferences, assuming a general con-
gruence between institutions and preferences. The 
findings of this literature were rather mixed, how-
ever (Jaeger, 2009). Therefore, more recent scholar-
ship focuses on particular institutional dimensions 
while also developing more concrete theoretical 
expectations on these (Busemeyer, 2012).
Against the background of this large literature, our 
article addresses public attitudes towards (several 
kinds of) education policies. This field has not yet 
received a lot of scholarly attention, even though – as 
we show below – education is a policy field, which 
enjoys a high degree of support from the general pub-
lic. It also has strong implications for socio-economic 
inequality (Busemeyer, 2015; Solga, 2014) and social 
mobility (Breen et al., 2009), which is why many 
scholars root for a transformation of existing welfare 
states towards the ‘social investment’ model 
(Hemerijck, 2013; Morel et al., 2012). So far, only 
few studies have analysed individual-level attitudes 
and preferences towards education policies from an 
international comparative perspective, probably 
related to the limitations of existing comparative pub-
lic opinion surveys in that respect (Busemeyer et al., 
2017). Using these existing data, Busemeyer et al. 
(2009) find that – in contrast to other social policies 
– individual support for more public education spend-
ing is strongly conditioned by age with the elderly 
being less supportive of spending. Moreover, 
Busemeyer (2012) and Busemeyer and Jensen (2012) 
study how macro-level factors such as existing levels 
of socio-economic and educational inequalities, as 
well as the institutional set-up of the education sys-
tem, affect people’s preference on education spend-
ing. Ansell (2010) and Garritzmann (2015, 2016) 
investigate public opinion on financial aid to higher 
education students, a much more redistributive area. 
Yet, when it comes to preferences for different kinds 
of education policy – the focus of this article – inter-
national survey data contain no information. Hence, 
Busemeyer et al. (2011) used data from a survey con-
ducted in Switzerland to study this issue.
In developing our theoretical framework, we 
draw extensively on existing scholarship in the study 
of public attitudes mentioned above. In general, 
there are some similarities in the determinants of 
individual-level support for education and welfare 
state policies, but there are also some important dif-
ferences. Due to the dearth of studies on preferences 
regarding the distribution of spending across differ-
ent educational sectors, there is little theory on the 
determinants of these types of preferences. Hence, 
our theoretical framework and our empirical analy-
sis need to remain somewhat exploratory.
First, we develop hypotheses on the impact of 
individual educational background. As Busemeyer 
et al. (2011) showed for the case of Switzerland, 
individuals tend to support additional spending on 
those sectors of the education system with which 
they have individual experiences. This can be con-
ceived of as a ‘socializing effect’. This is less obvi-
ous than it may sound because it could also have 
been expected that individuals develop policy pref-
erences different from their own experiences. For 
instance, someone with an educational background 
in vocational education and training (VET) might 
prefer policies that promote the expansion of higher 
education so that his or her children will be better 
able to receive this kind of education. Vice versa, a 
person with an academic background might oppose 
the further expansion of higher education and sup-
port VET instead so that there is less competition for 
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himself or herself and for his or her children (see 
also Di Stasio, 2017). However, we hypothesize that 
the socializing effect of individual educational back-
ground is stronger than the ‘rational rationing’ effect. 
Hence, individuals with a vocational (academic) 
educational background are expected to support pol-
icies that expand the provision of vocational (aca-
demic) education (Hypothesis 1).
Second, in addition to educational background, we 
expect that the respondents’ income situation matters 
(Ansell, 2010; Busemeyer, 2012; Garritzmann, 2015, 
2016). Of course, educational background and income 
are correlated, but the correlation is not perfect (if 
only because there is an increasing heterogeneity of 
incomes for individuals with a higher education 
degree as a consequence of academic expansion). 
Therefore, we hypothesize that both have separate 
effects on attitudes. The effect of income on prefer-
ences is related to material self-interest. We posit that 
support for different policies is driven by expectations 
on the relative payoff for individuals themselves or 
their associated kind, in particular children. It is well 
known that the class bias in access to particular sec-
tors of the education system is stronger in some cases 
than in others. This is most obvious in the case of 
higher education: children from higher socio-eco-
nomic backgrounds still have a much higher probabil-
ity of attending higher education institutions compared 
to children from weaker socio-economic backgrounds 
(Breen et al., 2009). A similar development has been 
observed in the case of early childhood education and 
care (Van Lancker, 2014): despite the fact that chil-
dren from parents with a weak socio-economic back-
ground would benefit more from attending formal 
childcare institutions, middle-class parents are more 
likely to actually make use of available services in 
order to be better able to combine work and family 
life. In sum, we expect individuals from high-income 
households to support policies that promote higher 
education and early childhood education and care, 
whereas low-income respondents should have a 
stronger interest in promoting general and vocational 
education (Hypothesis 2).
Third, the existing research on welfare state atti-
tudes repeatedly revealed that individuals have a 
strong interest in the continued provision of welfare 
state services and benefits, which provide concrete 
benefits to themselves (Hypothesis 3). This general 
argument can be applied in different ways to our 
research question. For one, it implies that students 
should have a stronger interest in increasing educa-
tion spending in general as well as spending on 
‘their’ type of education more specifically (usually 
higher education since we only include individuals 
aged 18 and above) compared to adults who are no 
longer in the education system. In a similar vein, 
parents are expected to support additional education 
spending, although their preferences on the distribu-
tion of resources across the education sectors are dif-
ficult to predict since they depend on their children’s 
current educational status. A straightforward expec-
tation is that parents of younger children favour con-
centrating spending on early childhood education 
and care as well as on schools, whereas parents of 
older children are more interested in higher expendi-
tures on post-secondary education (vocational and 
higher education).
Fourth, in addition to variables related to self-
interest, we posit that the individuals’ political atti-
tudes and normative orientations matter. Previous 
research has shown for the case of Switzerland that 
ideological orientations matter mostly with regard 
to the overall level of public spending on education 
rather than its distribution across education sectors 
(Busemeyer et al., 2011). Therefore, we expect that 
the association between policy preferences and ide-
ological orientations will be stronger in the case of 
overall levels of spending compared to its distribu-
tion. Furthermore, left-leaning individuals should 
be more supportive of policies that promote the 
expansion of those sectors of the education system, 
which are more open to the inclusion of children 
from lower socio-economic backgrounds (general 
and in particular vocational education). In contrast, 
right-leaning individuals should support the promo-
tion of sectors that benefit the better-off (higher 
education and early childhood education and care) 
(Hypothesis 4).
Finally, we expect that the institutional set-up of 
the education system affects policy preferences. 
There are, however, conflicting predictions in the 
theoretical literature on ‘policy feedback’ regarding 
the dominant direction of this association. On one 
hand, Pierson (1993) and many others emphasize the 
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centrality of self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms. 
According to this perspective, individuals would 
support those kinds of institutions, which are already 
in place in their respective countries. This is because 
they either derive concrete benefits from these insti-
tutions (what Pierson (1993: 624) calls ‘resource’ or 
‘incentive effects’) or because people’s normative 
expectations vis-à-vis the state are shaped by them 
(‘interpretive effects’, Pierson, 1993: 610; see also 
McDonnell (2009) for an application to the case of 
education policy). On the other hand, institutions can 
also generate effects that are ‘self-undermining’ in 
the long term (Jacobs and Weaver, 2015). This kind 
of feedback signals that the public might come to 
demand policies that are different from the institu-
tional status quo (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010). 
Empirically, the existing evidence is mixed on which 
type of feedback is dominant, but there are good rea-
sons to expect that self-undermining feedback effects 
will dominate, in particular if they interact with con-
crete socio-economic pressures (Hypothesis 5). This 
is because citizens are more likely to demand policy 
change if they are dissatisfied with the current insti-
tutional status quo (Jacobs and Weaver, 2015).
Data and methods
The INVEDUC survey
Given the weaknesses of existing comparative sur-
veys of public opinion briefly discussed above, we 
conducted an original survey in eight European 
countries in 2014:1 Denmark, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. Unfortunately, due to funding constraints, 
no Eastern or non-European countries could be 
included. Hence, the scope of our argument and 
empirical analysis is restricted to Western Europe, 
but covers a wide variety of countries and welfare 
state regimes. In each of the eight countries, we sur-
veyed a representative sample of 1000–1500 adults 
(aged 18–99). Overall, we have 8905 valid observa-
tions. The fieldwork was conducted in early sum-
mer 2014 by a professional survey institute via 
computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) 
(see Busemeyer et al., 2017 for a descriptive over-
view and more details).
Dependent variables
The Investing in Education in Europe (INVEDUC) 
dataset contains a number of questions that are rele-
vant for the purpose of this article. Next, we discuss 
the wording of the questions that we use as depend-
ent variables. We start with a question that essen-
tially replicates the question asked in the ISSP ‘role 
of government’ surveys:
Q1: In the following, I will name several areas of 
government activity. Please tell me whether you would 
like to see more or less government spending in each 
area. Keep in mind that ‘more’ or ‘much more’ might 
require a tax increase.
The survey then named ‘education’ as one of nine 
policy fields (healthcare, unemployment benefits, old 
age pensions, social assistance to the poor, financial 
support for families, education, labour market and 
public employment programmes, defence, environ-
mental protection). Respondents were offered the 
usual Likert-scale answers: ‘spend much more’, 
‘spend more’, ‘spend the same as now’, ‘spend less’, 
‘spend much less’, plus a residual category ‘don’t 
know’.
As discussed above, this question has several 
weaknesses (for instance, it does not distinguish 
between different education sectors), but it was nev-
ertheless included in the INVEDUC survey in order 
to be able to anchor and compare the survey’s results 
with existing data. Another major problem with this 
question is that no constrains are added, that is, 
respondents could express support for more public 
spending in all the areas mentioned without having 
to take into account revenue constraints. As a simple 
solution to this problem, we added a second ques-
tion, forcing respondents to select only a single pol-
icy area where they would like to see public 
expenditure increased:
Q2: If the government could increase spending for only 
one area of its activity, which one of the following 
should it be in your opinion?
As answer categories we offered the same nine 
policy areas used before, but in this case, respondents 
had to make a choice between the different policy 
378 Journal of European Social Policy 27(4)
areas. The order of the policy fields was randomized 
in order to avoid that the ordering of the suggested 
answers somehow affects respondents’ answers.
In order to address the second major weakness of 
existing surveys (i.e. no differentiation between educa-
tion sectors), we included two additional questions:
Q3: Let’s talk about the distribution of public spending 
in the education sector. Please tell me whether you 
would like to see more or less government spending in 
each of the following areas. Keep in mind that ‘more’ 
or ‘much more’ might require a tax increase.
Respondents were offered four answer catego-
ries: ‘Pre-school and early childhood education’,2 
‘general school education’, ‘vocational education 
and training’ and ‘universities and other higher edu-
cation’. Of course, we could have differentiated fur-
ther between even more fine-grained categories, but 
we believe that these four groups cover the major 
areas and conflict lines well while simultaneously 
keeping the question framing as simple and compa-
rable as possible. For each of the four education sec-
tors, respondents were asked whether they would 
like to ‘spend much more’, ‘spend more’, ‘spend the 
same as now’, ‘spend less’, ‘spend much less’ or 
whether they ‘don’t know’.
Moreover, mirroring the spending priority ques-
tion for various fields of government activity (Q2), 
we again forced respondents to make a priority state-
ment about the education sectors:
Q4: If the government could increase spending for one 
part of the education system only, which part should 
the government choose, in your opinion?
Here, respondents had to choose one and only one 
of the four education sectors or a residual category 
(‘don’t know’ or ‘no answer’). Again, we randomized 
the order of the offered answer categories.
Methods
When studying the determinants of these prefer-
ences, we run a set of regression analyses. We 
dichotomize the respective dependent variables in 
the common fashion, that is, for Q1 and Q3 we code 
respondents who demand ‘more’ or ‘much more’ 
spending as ‘1’ and all others as ‘0’. For the priority 
question (Q2), we coded those respondents who 
mentioned ‘education’ as ‘1’ and respondents who 
mentioned other areas as ‘0’. In the case of Q4, we 
run different regression models for each of the edu-
cation sectors, where a coding of ‘1’ represents 
respondents prioritizing that particular sector. We 
use logit regressions in order to study the determi-
nants of the respective preferences. As we are also 
interested in country-level determinants (such as 
how the level of current education spending in the 
respective sectors affects popular demand), we 
would ideally include these factors as macro-level 
variables in multilevel models, but due to the low 
number of macro-level observations (eight coun-
tries), this is unfeasible (Stegmueller, 2011). As a 
best-practice solution, we pool the data for all coun-
tries and include country fixed-effects (i.e. country 
dummies) in the regressions to control for country 
differences and we cluster the standard errors by 
country to account for the nested structure of the 
data.3 We comment on differences across countries 
(related to Hypothesis 5) in the final section of the 
empirical analysis.
Control variables
In the regressions, we use a standard set of control 
variables: age, household net income (in country-spe-
cific quintiles), education (distinguishing between 
five categories: basic education, upper secondary 
(general), upper secondary (vocational), post-second-
ary non-tertiary and tertiary education), gender, 
household composition (having small or older chil-
dren), being a single parent, working in the public sec-
tor and ideological self-placement on the left–right 
scale. Further details on operationalizations of these 
variables, descriptive statistics, robustness tests and 
missing data can be found in the Online Appendix.4
Findings
Descriptive findings
Table A in the Online Appendix provides an over-
view of the descriptive statistics for all variables 
included in our analysis (cf. also Busemeyer et al., 
2017 for additional descriptive analyses).5 Here, we 
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focus on some major findings. First, asking respond-
ents for their support for more public spending on 
education without enforcing any constraints (Q1 
from above) reveals a large majority of about 75 per-
cent of all respondents supporting more or much 
more governmental spending on education, which is 
similar to findings based on ISSP data (Ansell, 2010; 
Busemeyer, 2012, 2015; Garritzmann, 2015, 2016). 
When respondents are forced to choose only one pol-
icy area for additional spending (Q2), education turns 
out to be the most favoured category in the pooled 
sample (27 percent vs 22 percent for healthcare, the 
second most chosen category). This is an impressive 
confirmation of Ansell’s (2010) claim that education 
is an ‘archetypical crowd-pleaser’ (p. 136).
Next, we turn towards preferences for spending 
increases across the different education sectors (Q3). 
In the cases of early childhood education (50 per-
cent) and higher education (47 percent), about half of 
all respondents express support for more or much 
more spending. This is a considerable share. Yet, 
support for increasing spending on general and voca-
tional education is even higher: here, a clear majority 
of 62 percent want to increase spending (in both 
cases). This finding is partly at odds with a core 
claim in the social investment literature (Bonoli, 
2013; Hemerijck, 2013; Morel et al., 2012), which 
often assumes that public demand is particularly 
strong in the cases of early childhood education and 
higher education. When forcing respondents to pick 
one and only one education sector where they would 
like to see more public spending (using Q4), the pop-
ularity advantage of general and vocational educa-
tion over higher education and early childhood 
education becomes even more pronounced. When 
forced to prioritize, 39 percent of respondents choose 
general school education to receive more public 
spending, compared to 30 percent for VET. In con-
trast, higher education (17%) and pre-school and 
early childhood education (15%) are mentioned to a 
much lesser degree.
Individual-level characteristics associated 
with education policy preferences
Next, we report results of our regression analyses to 
study the individual-level characteristics associated 
with these preferences. Due to the cross-sectional 
design of the survey and the nature of our data, 
which is observational rather than experimental, 
these should not be interpreted as causal effects in 
the strict sense but rather as correlational associa-
tions. We present the results of coefficient plots in 
order to facilitate readability (Jann, 2013); detailed 
regression tables are provided in the Online 
Appendix (Tables B1, B2 and B3). The coefficient 
plots display average marginal effects of all covari-
ates. Figure 1 displays the determinants of support 
for additional education spending. In the left panel, 
we use the question wording that does not contain 
any particular constraints (Q1). On the right-hand 
side, we employ the question that forces citizens to 
prioritize (Q2). Thus, a comparison of the two fig-
ures reveals which factors are associated with sup-
port for education spending in a constrained and in a 
non-constrained environment.
In the non-constrained environment (Q1), we 
find a statistically significant association between 
partisan ideology and spending support. Since 
higher values on this scale indicate a higher degree 
of conservatism, left-leaning individuals are found 
to be more supportive of spending increases. 
Reproducing previous findings (Busemeyer, 2012), 
respondents’ income position does not have any 
effect on spending support. The same holds true for 
educational background. There is some evidence 
that parents of older children are more in favour of 
public spending on education.
The picture changes considerably, however, once 
we move into the constrained scenario (Q2). In this 
case, partisan ideology loses its explanatory power. 
Instead, educational background and income turn 
out to be significant predictors, confirming Ansell’s 
(2010) and Garritzmann’s (2015, 2016) findings for 
higher education. Compared to the baseline category 
(basic education), the coefficients of all other educa-
tion degrees are positive and significant, that is, 
respondents with higher educational degrees are 
more likely to prioritize education over other policy 
areas. Furthermore, the magnitude of the estimated 
effect becomes larger for higher levels of education. 
We have similar findings regarding income. In other 
words, when respondents are forced to choose 
between different fields of government activity, 
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high-income and highly educated citizens choose the 
policy, which is less redistributive compared to other 
social policies. We can reproduce this finding when 
using respondents’ individual income position 
instead of their household income. Moreover, we 
tested for non-linear effects but found the effect of 
income to be linear (which is why we present the 
simpler metric form here). Our indicators of narrow 
self-interest (having children at different ages) turn 
out not to be significant predictors of preferences.
In Figure 2, we analyse preferences for the distri-
bution of public resources separately across different 
education sectors. Similar to Figure 1, the left-hand 
side displays findings for the question without con-
straints on spending (Q3). Again, we find a signifi-
cant association between support and partisan 
ideology: left-leaning individuals express more sup-
port for public spending in general, so they also sup-
port more spending on all sectors of the education 
system. This association with partisan ideology dis-
appears, however, once we move into the constrained 
scenario on the right-hand side, where respondents 
were forced to prioritize between different education 
sectors (Q4). In this case, the ‘socialization thesis’ 
(Hypothesis 1) is supported by the finding that 
highly educated individuals are also more likely to 
express support for the concentration of public 
resources on higher educational levels. More specifi-
cally, respondents with a vocational background are 
significantly more likely to demand higher spending 
on VET, whereas respondents with a background in 
academic higher education prefer to prioritize public 
expenditure on higher education instead (this finding 
is a bit weaker in the constrained scenario, how-
ever).6 Interestingly, we also find that respondents 
with the lowest educational background (the base-
line category) are more supportive of pre-primary 
education. This might be related to the fact that chil-
dren from lower socio-economic status groups are 
underrepresented in this sector of the education sys-
tem across Europe (Van Lancker, 2014), which is 
why their parents demand more spending in order to 
Figure 1. Determinants of support for education spending in an unconstrained (Q1, left-hand side) and constrained 
(Q2, right-hand side) scenario.
Average marginal effects based on single-level logit models with country fixed-effects and country-clustered standard errors. The 
plotted confidence bands are on a 95 percent-level. The reference category for the education dummies is ‘having only basic educa-
tion’.
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compensate for this, or might simply be due to the 
fact that they are less likely to support higher-than-
basic forms of education than other respondents.
Somewhat contrary to our expectations, income 
does not seem to matter when it comes to the distri-
bution of resources across sectors with the important 
exception of early childhood education, where we 
find a negative association, which we discuss in 
greater detail below. Again, the finding is highly 
similar when using individual income instead. There 
is, however, evidence for another kind of self-inter-
est at work: parents with children at home express 
spending preferences that are in line with the educa-
tional needs of their children, and these associations 
are rather similar across the different scenarios: par-
ents with small children (<10 years) prefer concen-
trating public spending on early childhood education 
and care as well as general schools and are less sup-
portive of spending on vocational and higher educa-
tion. Vice versa, parents of older children (≥10 years) 
prefer to channel resources to general schools and 
higher education. Interestingly, we do not see an 
increase in support for spending on VET for parents 
of older children. This could be explained by the fact 
that they expect their children to attend higher edu-
cation rather than VET, which in turn might be 
related to popular perceptions of the supposedly 
lower status of VET relative to academic education 
in most European countries.
Variation across countries
Finally, we explore the cross-national variation in 
policy preferences. For reasons of space availability, 
we concentrate on cross-country variation in spend-
ing priorities across education sectors. Figure A in 
the Online Appendix displays additional descriptive 
statistics (see also Busemeyer et al., 2017 for more 
details). All in all, we find that general school educa-
tion is the category chosen most in the majority of 
countries. In Denmark and France, however, the 
public regards additional spending on VET as more 
Figure 2. Determinants of support for distribution of spending across education sectors (panel on the left: no 
constraints; panel on the right: respondents forced to prioritize).
Average marginal effects based on single-level logit models with country fixed-effects and country-clustered standard errors. The 
plotted confidence bands are on a 95 percent-level. The reference category for the education dummies is ‘having only basic educa-
tion’.
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important. Even though it does not occupy the top 
spot, VET is also popular in Spain, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom, whereas pre-primary education 
receives more support in Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and Ireland. Finally, higher education is 
mentioned as priority in Italy and Spain to a much 
higher degree than in the other countries. Hence, 
there is some evidence that citizens demand addi-
tional spending in those educational sectors, which 
are not yet fully developed in their respective coun-
tries. This is, for instance, early childhood education 
in Germany, higher education in Italy or vocational 
education in France.
Moving beyond descriptive statistics, a simple 
way to substantiate this further is to interpret the 
country fixed-effects (i.e. country dummy variables) 
from the regression analyses substantively. To do 
this, we estimated a multinomial model (which pro-
duces the same result as the series of logit models 
presented above), regressing the answers to the 
forced-choice scenario on educational sectors (Q4) 
on the independent variables. Figure 3 displays the 
average marginal effects of the country dummies (cf. 
also Table C4 in Online Appendix). Germany is cho-
sen as the reference category. The advantage of this 
procedure compared to simple descriptive statistics 
is that it takes into account differences in the socio-
demographic composition across countries to the 
extent that they are captured by the individual-level 
control variables. The downside is that it is not 
immediately clear how large the support for the dif-
ferent sectors in the individual countries actually is.
The broad pattern hinting at self-undermining 
feedback effects seen in the descriptive statistics is 
also present in Figure 3. The upper-left panel shows 
that support for prioritizing pre-primary education is 
particularly high in Germany since almost all other 
countries (except Ireland) are below the zero line. In 
contrast, support for prioritizing VET is low in 
Germany in international comparison, but particu-
larly high in France and Denmark as well as Italy and 
Spain. Confirming the descriptive statistics, relative 
Figure 3. Respondents’ preferences towards public education spending across different educational sectors and 
different countries when forced to select only one spending area.
We plot the coefficient estimate and 95 percent-confidence intervals for the country fixed-effects (average marginal effects). Ger-
many is used as the reference category.
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support for more spending on higher education is 
exceptionally high in Southern Europe, but there is 
little cross-national variation in support for higher 
education among the other countries. There is more 
cross-national variation in the support for general 
schooling (upper-right panel), with Swedish and 
German respondents being most likely to prioritize 
this sector of the education system and French 
respondents the least likely.
Discussion
In the following, we summarize and discuss the 
empirical findings in relation to our hypotheses. First, 
our analysis confirms that educational background is 
strongly related to policy preferences, providing sup-
port for the ‘socialization thesis’ (Hypothesis 1). The 
higher individuals’ education, the more likely they 
are to support investments in education rather than 
other kinds of social policies. Moreover, they are also 
more likely to favour the concentration of public 
resources on the education sector, which fits their 
individual education experiences (i.e. academic 
higher education or vocational education). There is 
mixed evidence for the thesis that respondents’ 
income position matters (Hypothesis 2): in the uncon-
strained scenarios, income is not significantly associ-
ated with education policy preferences, potentially 
because the overall level of support is very high. In 
the constrained scenarios, however, the association 
between income and preferences is stronger: Richer 
individuals favour education over other social poli-
cies (probably because it is less redistributive and 
they are more likely to benefit). Somewhat against 
expectations, however, richer individuals are not 
more likely to prioritize investments in higher educa-
tion and they are even less likely to favour prioritiz-
ing early childhood education, even though childcare 
services tend to be used more often by wealthier indi-
viduals. A potential explanation is that these groups 
prefer keeping these education sectors exclusive and 
oppose further expansion.
Furthermore, we find that self-interest related to 
individuals’ position in the welfare state matters 
(Hypothesis 3). Parents with small children at home 
are in favour of concentrating public resources on 
early childhood education and general schooling, 
that is, those education sectors with the greatest ben-
efit to them. Parents with older children, in contrast, 
are less supportive of spending on early childhood 
education and would like to distribute resources to 
higher education instead. What is more, partisan ide-
ology has been confirmed to be strongly associated 
with policy preferences (Hypothesis 4). This is – 
mirroring the findings for income – mainly the case 
for the unconstrained scenarios, however. As soon 
as respondents have to prioritize spending, their ide-
ological standpoint matters less and their self-inter-
est plays a bigger role.
Why should self-interest be more important in the 
constrained scenarios compared to the unconstrained 
ones? One potential explanation is that respondents 
simply think harder about their real preferences 
when confronted with choice scenarios. Given the 
widespread popularity of education, few politicians 
would openly oppose educational expansion as 
Busemeyer et al. (2013) confirm studying party 
positions. This dynamic could also play out on the 
micro-level of policy preferences. Citizens would 
not openly oppose further spending on education 
(partly because of social desirability bias), but when 
forced to choose between policies that provide con-
crete benefits in the present (e.g. social transfer pro-
grammes) and others that create diffuse benefits in 
the future (e.g. education policy for those who do not 
directly benefit from educational investments as par-
ents or teachers), respondents opt for the former 
rather than the latter. Our findings show that this 
dynamic even plays out when comparing different 
sectors of the education system.
Finally, we found some evidence for institutional 
feedback effects (Hypothesis 5), but our conclusions 
in this respect must be preliminary given the limited 
number of countries and the cross-sectional nature of 
the data. All in all, it seems that institutional feed-
back effects could be conditioned by socio-economic 
problem pressure. If existing institutions perform 
sufficiently well, there is little popular demand for 
large-scale change. But if the institutional status quo 
is perceived to produce undesired outcomes, public 
opinion is likely to favour policy change (as is also 
argued in Jacobs and Weaver (2015)). Rather than 
completely abandoning public education when dis-
satisfied with the current performance, respondents 
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favour more public investments in those educational 
sectors which are perceived to contribute to the solu-
tion of pressing socio-economic problems. Following 
Chung and Meuleman (2017), this can be called an 
‘improvement reaction’ rather than a ‘punishment 
reaction’ from critical citizens (p. 51).
There are several examples in the data that fit this 
pattern. First, there are countries suffering from high 
levels of youth and general unemployment in the 
wake of the economic and financial crisis, where 
citizens prioritize investments in post-secondary 
education such as VET and higher education (Italy, 
Spain and France). This could be because these types 
of education are closer to labour market needs. 
Second, support for additional spending on general 
schools is particularly high in Sweden, even though 
spending levels are already high in international 
comparison. This could be related to a significant 
deterioration in educational performance in 
Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) in recent years, changing perceptions of the 
relative performance of the system, which leads citi-
zens to demand more investment to counter this 
trend. Third, we find strong support for increasing 
spending on early childhood and pre-primary educa-
tion in Germany, where increasing demand for child-
care provision seems to have outstripped the (also 
increasing) supply in recent years.
Conclusion
In concluding, we would like to come back to the 
issue of ‘education as social policy’, the core theme 
of this Special Issue. Our findings entail some posi-
tive and some worrisome news for proponents of 
welfare state reform towards the social investment 
model (Bonoli, 2013; Hemerijck, 2013; Morel et al., 
2012). The good news is that education is indeed very 
popular across different countries and socio-eco-
nomic groups, even if citizens are forced to prioritize 
between education and other social policies. Thus, 
supportive public opinion can create propitious tail-
winds for policy-makers engaging in education 
reform. However, the important caveat is that once 
policy-makers engage in decisions about the distribu-
tion of scarce fiscal resources across different poli-
cies and/or sectors of the education system, they are 
confronted with politically difficult distributive con-
flicts between constituencies rooted in material self-
interest (cf. also Busemeyer and Garritzmann, 2017).
Furthermore, our survey also revealed that the pri-
orities of policy-makers at the European Union (EU) 
and national level are not entirely aligned with the 
demands of European populations. For instance, the 
EU’s ‘Strategic Framework – Education and Training 
2020’7 prioritizes the expansion of higher tertiary 
education and early childhood education but does not 
really address VET or primary education. Our survey, 
however, shows that most people would like to see 
more investments in general schooling and VET 
rather than higher or early childhood education. The 
high levels of support for additional spending on gen-
eral schools might be related to the fact that it prepares 
for participation in higher education, whereas support 
for VET could be driven by labour market concerns. 
The mismatch between public demands and policy-
makers’ priorities on the EU level is, of course, related 
to the limited competencies of the EU in education 
policy. Nevertheless, our survey shows that VET is 
widely considered to be a credible alternative to aca-
demic higher education in many European countries 
and that citizens in countries in which it so far remains 
institutionally underdeveloped would like to see more, 
not less, public investment in this sector. Of course, in 
countries with dual apprenticeship training systems 
such as Germany, employers have a high degree of 
autonomy in their hiring decisions with potentially 
discriminating effects (see Protsch and Solga, 2017), 
and public demands vis-à-vis the state might be less 
important in these settings.
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The online appendix material is available online.
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Notes
1. The survey was conducted in the context of the pro-
ject ‘Investing in Education in Europe’ (INVEDUC), 
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financed by a Starting Grant from the European 
Research Council (ERC), Grant No. 311769.
2. To avoid ambiguity, we also made the follow-
ing definition available to respondents on request: 
‘Early childhood education refers to the early child-
hood educational development for children between 
0–2 years and pre-school education from the age of 3 
to the start of primary education’.
3. As Tables C1–C3 in Online Appendix show, running 
multilevel models instead of the single-level equa-
tions with country fixed-effects and country-clus-
tered errors produces highly similar results.
4. In additional models, we used several other opera-
tionalizations of the variables (e.g. educational years, 
individual income and non-linear effects), which pro-
duced highly similar results. We discuss these find-
ings below.
5. In calculating the descriptive statistics, we employ 
survey weights in order to correct for selection prob-
abilities and population sizes (see Busemeyer et al., 
2017 for more details).
6. When we use education years instead, this also 
becomes visible, as support for higher education (in 
both Q3 and Q4) increases with years of education 
but decreases for vocational education and training 
(VET; in the constrained scenario, Q4).
7. http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/strategic- 
framework_en
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